East Sussex Holiday Food Vouchers:
What the Council’s Own Documents Show

Published 18 September 2026 · Evidence page and full FOI disclosure

Our finding: East Sussex County Council’s own records show that ending automatic school-holiday food vouchers was a local policy choice—not a specific instruction from the Department for Work and Pensions. The Council proceeded into the summer knowing that its mitigations would reach only “at least some” affected families, that not all families in hardship were open to Children’s Services, and that the general crisis-payment service would not be available until September. The only disclosed Equality Impact Assessment is dated August, after the summer holiday had begun. The Council has not supplied evidence showing how many children who lost vouchers were fed, how many missed out, or that the most vulnerable children were reached.

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Public statement from The Grumpy Cook

The Grumpy Cook believes that families experiencing hardship should be treated with dignity and given clear, accurate information about support that affects whether children eat well during the school holidays.

We asked East Sussex County Council for the recorded evidence behind its decision to end automatic holiday food vouchers for children eligible for benefits-related free school meals. The Council disclosed internal reports, minutes, briefings, risk papers, communications and an Equality Impact Assessment.

The papers do not show that the Government specifically ordered East Sussex to stop the vouchers. National guidance changed the funding model and encouraged more targeted, needs-assessed support, but it also left councils discretion over how to ensure that the poorest children do not go hungry. East Sussex chose to move away from automatic vouchers.

That choice was being developed months before the county council election. After the election, the new council continued the delivery plan. Its June paper acknowledged that the risk would be greatest during the summer, that not every struggling family would already be known to Children’s Services, and that the full commissioned crisis-payment service would not yet be live.

We recognise the investment in holiday activities, advice, targeted crisis support, food partnerships and longer-term financial resilience. Those services matter. But the Council’s own August assessment says the Holiday Activities and Food programme is not a like-for-like replacement for vouchers. The disclosed record does not show how many children who lost vouchers received food, how many missed out, or that the children at greatest risk of holiday hunger were identified and fed.

This is why we are publishing the complete disclosure pack. Families deserve the evidence, not a slogan.

What the documents establish

  1. DWP did not order East Sussex to stop the vouchers.

    The national guidance gave councils discretion and said support “may not” take the form of blanket vouchers. East Sussex turned that into an internal position that vouchers “will need to be ceased”. Planning to reduce or stop them had already begun in November 2025, before the final guidance appeared.

  2. East Sussex knowingly created a support gap.

    The April member briefing explicitly warned that there might be a gap between HSF support ending and CRF payments becoming available. Vouchers ended after May half-term, while the public crisis-payment service was not expected until September.

    The May risk log anticipated:

    • financial consequences for affected families;
    • increased crisis-payment applications;
    • a minimum of around 1,000 applications a month;
    • negative publicity;
    • some services not operating until autumn; and
    • pressure on food banks and community organisations.

  3. The missing-family problem was identified but not solved.

    The Children’s Services appendix recognised the need for a route for “Level 2” families not already receiving council services. It proposed that a VCSE organisation could hold and distribute cash or vouchers after schools signposted families to it. The annual-cost cell for that proposal is blank; the notes refer only to officer resource and cash for crisis payments.

    By June, the transition paper was still calling for the Council to “clarify” the route to crisis payments for families outside statutory services.

  4. The Equality Impact Assessment is a major vulnerability.

    The disclosed EqIA is labelled August 2026. It refers to decisions already approved in March and June, so it post-dates the substantive decisions and the start of the summer holiday. Its final sign-off fields contain no names or dates. The document says it is not final without those approvals, and its own template says an assessment must be considered when a decision is taken, “not afterwards”.

    The EqIA also says HAF is not a like-for-like replacement. It records 3,992 individual children attending summer HAF in 2025/26, against 16,427 children eligible for benefits-related free school meals in January 2026—roughly one child in four. The comparison may overstate the proportion of the FSM group reached because HAF attendance can include children who are not FSM-eligible.

    This does not by itself prove an Equality Act breach. It does raise a serious question about whether East Sussex demonstrated proper “due regard” when it made the decision. The Public Sector Equality Duty requires public authorities, when carrying out their functions, to have due regard to eliminating unlawful discrimination, advancing equality of opportunity and fostering good relations.

  5. There is no disclosed method for identifying “the poorest children”.

    In its FOI response, East Sussex says it holds no local policy or guidance specifically explaining how it complies with paragraph 44 of the CRF guidance. Asked how it identifies “the poorest”, the Council linked to general datasets and a report. Those links do not provide criteria, a definition, an assessment method or an operational process for deciding which children qualify.

  6. There is no meaningful disclosed monitoring evidence.

    East Sussex supplied the blank snapshot survey, but not completed responses, aggregated results, the promised more comprehensive end-of-summer survey, July-to-September reports to the CRF Programme Board, or evidence of any contingency action taken.

    The blank survey itself asks organisations to count additional families seeking help because the voucher scheme ended. That is impact gathering after the withdrawal, not evidence that the risk was resolved before families lost support.

  7. The Council intentionally reduced direct household support.

    The February framework says approximately 90% of HSF funding went directly to households, compared with just under 60% planned under CRF in year one. It says the transition could be accommodated partly because crisis payments would have more structured criteria and eligibility requirements, and because it was “very likely” that not all previous recipients would come forward.

    In practical terms, anticipated attrition formed part of the case for reducing the share of funding reaching households directly.

  8. The public messaging is incomplete.

    The alternatives poster says the vouchers ended “due to changes in Government funding”. HSF did end nationally, so that statement is not wholly false. But it gives the impression that withdrawal was unavoidable. The internal papers show that East Sussex retained discretion over its CRF allocation and chose both the timing and the replacement model.

Did the response change after the May election?

East Sussex elected 50 councillors on 7 May 2026: 22 Reform UK, 13 Liberal Democrats, 11 Green, 3 Conservative and 1 Independent Democrat. The paperwork crosses that election, allowing a direct comparison. View the official election results.

Before 7 May After 7 May
November–February: officers developed a move away from automatic vouchers and toward narrower, assessed support. 13 May and June: the delivery plan continued toward formal approval and submission to DWP.
March: Lead Members approved the framework. 2 June: officers gave a clearer account of the summer gap and the families who might not be reached.
1 April: members were warned that the transition “may cause a gap”. June: extra communications, more frequent monitoring, clearer Family Hub routes and possible contingency action were proposed.
6 May: the risk log recorded financial consequences, negative media risk, election communications, pressure on food support and a September target for the new application scheme. The vouchers were not restored, no universal equivalent was introduced, and public communications continued to frame the ending as resulting from Government funding changes.

Our assessment of the change

Positive: the post-election June paper is more candid about the risk; it proposes stronger communications, monitoring and contingency planning; and it records substantial investment in HAF, advice, food partnerships and targeted crisis support.

Negative or unchanged: the core policy continued despite the acknowledged gap. The Council knew its measures would reach only “at least some” affected families, ended automatic support before the general crisis-payment service was operational, and did not produce the only disclosed EqIA until after the summer holiday had begun. Access became narrower and dependent on activities, signposting, assessment or an existing professional relationship.

Overall: the post-election papers were more candid, but the Council still proceeded into the period of greatest risk without a like-for-like replacement and without disclosed evidence that the most vulnerable children were identified and fed.

What East Sussex can reasonably argue

  • The Household Support Fund ended nationally and the Crisis and Resilience Fund is a different, three-year programme.
  • East Sussex spent about £850,000 extending vouchers through Easter and May half-term 2026.
  • The Council allocated £325,000 to expand HAF, £505,000 to practitioner-led crisis payments for families, £300,000 to food partnerships and community food organisations, and £825,000 to enhanced advice.
  • The new model aims to combine emergency help with advice, prevention and longer-term resilience.
  • Officers did record the transition risk and proposed monitoring and contingency measures.

Those facts belong in the record. The strongest case is not that East Sussex did nothing. It is that the Council knowingly removed a broad, accessible form of support before putting an adequate and accessible replacement in place.

The policy direction began before the May election, while the detailed delivery plan was approved after it. Responsibility therefore spans decisions made on both sides of that election.

Questions East Sussex still needs to answer

  1. What recorded definition, criteria or method is used to identify the “poorest children” for school-holiday support?
  2. How many families sought help between June and September, how many received it, how quickly, and how many were refused or abandoned the process?
  3. What did the partner survey and promised end-of-summer review find?
  4. Were any contingency funds released when demand rose at food banks, advice agencies, Family Hubs or Children’s Services?
  5. When was the EqIA first completed, considered and formally signed off, and by whom?
  6. Why did public material attribute the ending to “changes in Government funding” without also explaining that the Council retained local discretion?
  7. Can the Council provide the remaining “Final Crisis and Resilience Fund MI Team” attachment and confirm whether the 10 July professional briefing is the document listed as “signposting”?

Update: internal review requested

19 September 2026: The Grumpy Cook asked East Sussex County Council to carry out a formal internal review of its FOI response.

The central unanswered question is:

What recorded evidence did East Sussex County Council hold showing how it would identify and ensure that the poorest children were fed during the school holidays after automatic food vouchers ended?

The review asks the Council to disclose the definition, criteria, identification method, access routes, coverage calculations and monitoring evidence on which it relied—or to confirm explicitly that no recorded information is held.

Read the full internal-review request

Dear Freedom of Information Team,

Thank you for your response and the documents supplied.

Please treat this email as a formal request for an internal review of the Council’s response.

The central question remains unanswered:

What recorded evidence did East Sussex County Council hold showing how it would identify and ensure that the poorest children were fed during the school holidays after automatic food vouchers ended?

The response says the Council holds no local policy or guidance specifically explaining how it complies with paragraph 44 of the Crisis and Resilience Fund guidance. When asked how “the poorest children” were identified, the response provided links to general deprivation datasets and a report.

Those sources may show where deprivation exists, but they do not provide:

  • a definition of “the poorest children”;
  • eligibility criteria;
  • a method for identifying individual children or families;
  • an assessment or referral process;
  • an operational route for families not already receiving council services; or
  • evidence that the children most at risk of holiday hunger actually received food.

This omission is particularly important because the Council’s own disclosed documents show that automatic vouchers ended after the May half-term; the general crisis-payment service was not expected until September; not every family experiencing hardship was open to Children’s Services; the “Level 2” route still needed clarification in June; the mitigations were described as partial and reaching “at least some” affected families; HAF was not a like-for-like replacement; and no completed monitoring results demonstrate how many children who lost vouchers were reached.

The Council has been asked to review whether adequate searches were carried out across Children’s Services, Adult Social Care and Health, the CRF Programme Team, HAF, Family Hubs and the officers responsible for the delivery plan.

In particular, the review asks for any recorded information held concerning:

  1. The definition, criteria or methodology used to identify “the poorest children” for school-holiday support.
  2. How children who previously received automatic vouchers were expected to be identified and reached after the scheme ended.
  3. The support route available during June, July and August for families not already open to Children’s Services or receiving a current professional intervention.
  4. Any assessment of how many children were expected to lose voucher support without receiving food through HAF, crisis payments or another replacement provision.
  5. Any recorded targets, coverage calculations or outcome measures used to determine whether the replacement arrangements were reaching the children at greatest risk of going hungry.
  6. Any completed monitoring, survey responses, aggregated findings or reports showing how many affected children or families received food or financial support after the vouchers ended.

The request makes clear that the Council is not being asked to create a new explanation. It is being asked for the recorded information on which it relied. If none is held for any numbered point, the Council has been asked to confirm that explicitly in accordance with section 1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act.

Status: awaiting the Council’s internal-review response.

Full disclosure: download the source documents

Download the complete updated FOI disclosure pack (ZIP)

The archive contains the Council’s covering FOI response, all 24 files supplied with it, and a further Council briefing received afterwards. The later document, Crisis & Resilience Fund – briefing for professionals, dated 10 July 2026, appears to correspond to the previously absent signposting material. “Final Crisis and Resilience Fund MI Team” remains outstanding.

Update: further document received

After this page was first prepared, we received the Council’s Crisis & Resilience Fund – briefing for professionals, dated 10 July 2026. It confirms that services were launching in stages and that the general crisis-payment service was only expected to become available by September 2026.

The interim directions were principally to advice services, Holiday Food and Fun, and the Family Information Service. For families seeking CRF support through Children’s Services, the document says a practitioner could apply only where the family had a current intervention.

Our assessment: this document confirms an operational gap, not merely a possible one. By 10 July—immediately before the long summer holiday—the Council was telling professionals that the general crisis-payment service would not be available until September. Automatic vouchers had already ended. The only direct CRF route described for families required an existing Children’s Services practitioner and a current intervention; other families were directed to activities, advice and signposting. The Council’s earlier paper had already admitted that its measures would help only “at least some” affected families and would not eliminate the risk. The only disclosed EqIA is dated August, after the holiday had begun. The Council has supplied no evidence showing how many children who lost vouchers were fed, how many missed out, or that the most vulnerable were reached.

Read the 10 July briefing (PDF)

View the 24 originally supplied files and later briefing
  • Response (some exempt).pdf
  • ASCH DMT Minute extract 04112025.pdf
  • ASCH DMT minute extract 10022026.pdf
  • Alternatives to holiday food vouchers (A4 Poster) FINAL.pdf
  • Appendix 1 CSD CRF areas for development.xlsx
  • Appendix 1 East Sussex CRF Delivery Plan Framework – Final Draft 29012026.pdf
  • CMT minute extract 18022026.pdf
  • CRF – Member Briefing 01 April 2026.pdf
  • CRF Delivery Framework ASCH DMT 10022026.pdf
  • CRF Delivery Framework CMT 18022026.pdf
  • CRF Delivery Framework CSD DMT 03022026.pdf
  • CRF EqIA August 2026.pdf
  • CRF Project Risk Log v7.pdf
  • CRF Transition Risk 020626 v2 (003).pdf
  • Crisis & Resilience Fund – briefing for professionals – 10 July 2026.pdf — received afterwards
  • CRF report DMT 4 November 2025.pdf
  • DMT 03 02 26 – MINUTES CRF.pdf
  • DMT 04 11 25 – MINUTES CRF.pdf
  • DMT Report Crisis Resilience Fund 13.01.26 final version.pdf
  • East Sussex CSD CRF Delivery Plan May 2026.pdf
  • June VSB – HUGGG Vouchers end – alternative advice and support.pdf
  • May VSB – HUGGG Vouchers to finish after May school holiday.pdf
  • Member briefing – Changes to the national school holiday food voucher scheme.pdf
  • Minutes CSD DMT 13.01.2026.pdf
  • Snapshot.pdf — blank partner survey

Method and right of reply

This page is based on documents supplied by East Sussex County Council under the Freedom of Information Act 2000. The Council says third-party personal data was removed under section 40(2). Our commentary separates direct documentary facts from our assessment. It is not a finding by a court, tribunal or regulator.

East Sussex County Council is invited to provide the remaining missing attachment, “Final Crisis and Resilience Fund MI Team”, completed monitoring, EqIA sign-off record, or any correction supported by evidence. The Grumpy Cook will correct factual errors promptly and publish material clarification.

Dignity First. This page is about public accountability and the practical consequences of a policy change for families—not party-political point-scoring.